Abstract. Traceable signatures (TS), suggested by Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung (Eurocrypt'04), extend group signatures to address various basic traceability issues beyond merely identifying the anonymous signer of a rogue signature. Namely, they enable the efficient tracing of all signatures produced by a misbehaving party without opening the identity of other parties. They also allow users to provably claim ownership of a previously signed anonymous signature. To date, known TS systems all rely on the random oracle model. In this work we present the first realization of the primitive that avoids resorting to the random oracle methodology in its security proofs. Furthermore, our realization's efficiency is comparable to that of nowadays' fastest and shortest standard model group signatures.
Introduction
Group Signatures Background. Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [22] , allow members of a group to sign messages without revealing their identity. When the necessity arises, an authority holding some privileged piece of information can "open" signatures and uncover the signer's identity. Such primitives find applications in electronic auctions or trusted computing platforms where anonymity is a central issue.
The first scalable coalition-resistant system was proposed by Ateniese et al. [4] . The recent years saw a continued interest in the primitive with the appearance of pairing-based constructions (e.g. [15, 43] ). In general, when it comes to signatures, pairing has been employed to achieve two goals: (1) short signatures and (2) realizations in the standard model, not relying on the random oracle idealization. Notably, Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [15] showed the first scheme featuring signatures shorter than 200 bytes. Its security was analyzed in (a relaxation of) the model of Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi (BMW) [7] , which captures the requirements of group signatures in three properties but assumes static groups. The setting of dynamic groups was formalized by BellareShi-Zhang (BSZ) [9] and, independently, by Kiayias-Yung [39] while efficient systems were given in [39, 43, 29, 26] .
The aforementioned practical proposals all rely on the random oracle model [8] . In the standard model, the theoretical constructions of [7, 9] were "only" proofs of concept (plausibility results), since the main interest is in getting efficient schemes. Using improved non-interactive zeroknowledge (NIZK) techniques [35, 34] inspired by an earlier homomorphic encryption scheme [16] , Boyen and Waters [19] showed a fairly efficient realization with logarithmic-size signatures in the static BMW model. They subsequently improved [20] it to get rid of the dependency of signatures' size on the group cardinality. Ateniese et al. [3] independently constructed another scheme relying on stronger interactive assumptions. Meanwhile, Groth [32] came up with constant-size signatures without random oracles in the (dynamic) BSZ model but signatures remained too long for practical use. In 2007, Groth showed [33] another standard model scheme with signatures shorter than 2 kB and full anonymity in the BSZ model. Traceable Signatures. In group signatures, if we are given a member's name and his public key, scanning all signatures and verify which ones were signed by that member is only doable by revoking the anonymity of all signatures (in particular, signatures of honest users). To overcome this and allow further tracing properties, Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung [38] introduced traceable signatures (TS). They still allow the group manager (GM) to open signatures individually. In addition, however, the GM can reveal a trapdoor allowing clerks to trace suspicious members' signatures without having to revoke anonymity of every single signature. Misbehaving users can thus be traced without affecting the anonymity of honest ones. Moreover, such a traceability results in increased scalability since tracing agents can run in parallel whereas traditional group signatures involve a centralized tracing authority 3 . Traceable signatures also support a mechanism enabling users to claim (and prove) the authorship of their own anonymously generated signatures.
Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung (KTY) formalized the security of traceable signatures via three properties termed misidentification security, non-frameability and anonymity. They suggested a first implementation of the primitive (using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [28] and thus the random oracle model) and proved its security under the Strong RSA and the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Later on, efficiency improvements were suggested by Ge and Tate [30] . Meanwhile, Nguyen and Safavi-Naini [43] and Choi, Park and Yung [23] gave pairing-based constructions with shorter signatures. More recently, Benjumea el al. [10] considered traceable signatures with extended capabilities in the multi-group setting and implemented them in the random oracle model.
Our Contribution. Constructions with security proofs in the random oracle model are known to sometimes have realizability problems [21] . In this paper we construct the first efficient traceable signature in the standard model, where we employ the Groth-Sahai [36] non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proof systems as part of the construction. We prove it secure in the KTY sense under non-interactive (and thus falsifiable) assumptions.
As far as efficiency goes, our scheme is on par with most efficient standard model group signatures: for recommended parameters, we obtain signatures of less than 2.6 kB, which is close to the size of Groth's signatures [33] while both schemes have similar computational complexities for signing and verification. From a security standpoint, the two constructions rely on intractability assumptions of comparable strengths. Whereas Groth's system in proved anonymous in the strong sense (i.e., where the adversary has access to an oracle that "removes" the anonymity of adversarially-chosen signatures), our basic scheme is anonymous in a weaker sense but readily extends -by applying the same twist as in [33] -to achieve the same anonymity level at a quite moderate additional cost: in this case, the signature size does not exceed 3 kB.
Our traceable signature system also allows users to non-interactively claim their own signatures in an abuse-free manner. In previous TS realizations, claims consist in zero-knowledge proofs that can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir transformation. In our setting, implementing claims using the Groth-Sahai techniques requires special care to make sure that dishonest group members will not be able to copy each other's claims. As a contribution of independent interest (and a novelty w.r.t. the proceedings version of this paper [40] ), we thus extend the original model of traceable signatures [38] in order to explicitly capture that honest users' claims cannot be copied by dishonest users. We then give a convenient way for signers to claim their signatures and nonmalleably link their claims to a long-term public key which they previously registered in a PKI.
Definition 2 ([20]).
In a group G of prime order p, the -Hidden Strong Diffie-Hellman problem ( -HSDH) is, given elements (g, Ω = g ω , u) $ ← G 3 and triples (g 1/ω+s i , g s i , u s i ) with s 1 , . . . , s ∈ Z * p , to find another triple (g 1/ω+s , g s , u s ) such that s = s i for i = 1, . . . , . We finally need a variant of the problem, called Triple Diffie-Hellman, recently considered by Belenkiy et al. [6] .
Definition 3. Let G be a group of prime order p. The (modified) -Triple Diffie-Hellman Problem ( -mTDH) is, given (g, g a , g b ) ∈ G 3 , for randomly chosen a, b $ ← Z * p , and distinct pairs (g 1/(a+c i ) , c i ) with c 1 , . . . , c ∈ Z * p , to output a triple (g µ , g bµ , g abµ ) for some non-zero µ ∈ Z * p . The original Triple Diffie-Hellman problem [6] was to find a triple (g aµ , g bµ , g abµ ) given the same inputs. In the paper, we only need these inputs to comprise a single pair (c, g 1/(a+c) ) (i.e., = 1). A related assumption, named BB-CDH [5] , asserts the infeasibility of finding g ab on input of (g a , g b ) as well as pairs (g 1/(a+c i ) , c i ) with c 1 , . . . , c ∈ Z * p . Under the knowledge of exponent assumption (KEA) 4 [25] , the -mTDH problem is equivalent to the BB-CDH problem. The hardness of -mTDH in generic groups is thus implied by the generic intractability of KEA [27, 1] and BB-CDH.
Model and Security Notions
As in [9, 39] , we assume a PKI and require each user i to hold a private/public key pair (usk[i], upk[i]) for an ordinary signature scheme. The public key upk[i] must be properly certified before the user registers as a group member.
A traceable signature [38] consists of the following algorithms or protocols.
Setup: given a security parameter λ ∈ N, this algorithm (possibly run by a trusted party) generates a group public key Y, that is widely distributed, and the matching private key S which is handed to the group manager. Join (GM,U i ) : is an interactive protocol, between the group manager GM and the prospective user U i , whereby the latter obtains a membership secret sec i , that nobody else knows, and a membership certificate cert i . The GM stores the whole transcript in a database called transcripts, which is a private database also containing the coin tosses that were used by the GM. Sign: given a certificate membership cert i , a membership secret sec i and a message M , this algorithm outputs a traceable signature σ of M . Verify: on input of a signature σ, a message M and a group public key Y, this deterministic algorithm returns 0 or 1. Open: takes as input a signature σ that verifies under the group public key Y, the corresponding private key S and the database transcripts of all transcripts of join protocols. It outputs the identity i of a group member. Reveal: takes in the group manager's private key S, the index i of a group member and the join transcript transcript i of user i. It outputs the latter's tracing trapdoor trace i . Trace: on input of a valid traceable signature σ, the group public key Y and a tracing trapdoor trace i for user i, this algorithm outputs either 0 or 1. Claim: takes as input the group public key Y, a valid message-signature pair (M, σ) issued by user i, the latter's membership secret sec i and certificate cert i as well as his private key usk [i] . The output is an authorship claim τ of user i for σ. 4 This assumption states that, given g, g a ∈ G, the only way to generate a pair (h, h a ) ∈ G 2 is to raise g and g a to some power and thus know x = log g (h).
Claim-Verify: given a group public key Y, a message-signature pair (M, σ), a claim τ and the public key upk[i] of user i, this deterministic algorithm outputs 0 or 1.
Security properties are formalized by experiments where the adversary is granted access to oracles sharing certain variables:
-state: contains the join transcripts, membership certificates and secrets that have been defined so far. -N is the number of users in the group. -Sigs: is the database of signatures issued by the Q sig oracle. -Claims: is the database of signatures that were issued by the Q sig oracle and subsequently claimed by the signer. -Revs: is the set of members that have been the input of a Q reveal query. -U p : is the set of honest users introduced in the system via a Q p-join query.
-U a : is the set of adversarially-controlled users in the system. -U b : is the set of users that were introduced by the adversary acting as a dishonest group manager.
For such users, the transcript of the join protocol is leaked to the adversary.
For reasons that will become apparent in security definitions (more precisely, when defining security against framing attacks), we will consider an equivalence class for message-signature pairs. The model of non-frameability considered in [39, 23] implicitly captures a flavor of strong unforgeability [2] in that it can only be satisfied when adversaries are unable to randomize existing signatures and turn them into other signatures on the same message. Here, due to the use of NIWI proof systems where non-interactive proofs are publicly re-randomizable, we will need to consider a slightly relaxed flavor of non-frameability. To this end, we define an equivalence relation over the signature space. In our scheme, each signature will consist of a number of traceability values, several commitments and a set of proofs elements. We say that two message-signature pairs (M 1 , σ 1 ), (M 2 , σ 2 ) belong to the same equivalence class, which we denote by (M 1 , σ 1 ) ≡ s (M 2 , σ 2 ), if they pertain to the same message (i.e., M 1 = M 2 ) and they comprise identical traceability values.
The various oracles that adversaries are given access to are listed below.
-Q Y : returns the public information (N, Y) of the system. -Q S : returns the group manager's private key and thereby allows the adversary to corrupt the latter. -Q p-join : is an oracle that privately introduces new honest users in the group. It simulates the join protocol in private, adds index N into U p , increases N by 1 and finally updates variables state and transcripts as state ← state||(N, transcript N , cert N , sec N ) and transcripts ← transcripts||(N, transcript N ). -Q a-join : allows the adversary to introduce users under his control in the group. The oracle, acting as the group manager, interacts with the malicious prospective user in the join protocol. If the protocol successfully terminates, the oracle increments N and finally sets state ← state||(N, transcript N , cert N , ⊥), transcripts ← transcripts||(N, transcript N ) and adds N into U a . -Q b-join : allows the adversary, acting as a dishonest group manager, to introduce new group members. The oracle, acting on behalf of the prospective user, interacts with the malicious group manager in the join protocol. If the latter successfully terminates, the oracle increases N by 1, sets state ← state||(N, transcript N , cert N , ⊥), and adds N into U b .
-Q sig : on input of a message M and a user index i, the oracle checks if state contains an entry of the form (i, ·, cert i , sec i ). If no such record is found or if i ∈ U a , it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it generates and returns a traceable signature on behalf of user i using cert i and sec i . It also sets Sigs ← Sigs||(i, M, σ).
-Q Claim : on input of a triple (i, M, σ), this oracle first checks whether i belongs to the set of good users (which is either U p or U b depending on the considered security notion) and whether a triple (i, M , σ ) such that (M , σ ) ≡ v (M, σ) appears in Sigs. If either of these conditions fails to hold (i.e., if user i is not an honest user or did not generate (M, σ)), it returns ⊥ and sets Claims ← Claims||(i, M, σ). Otherwise, it outputs a non-interactive authorship claim τ for the pair (M, σ) on behalf of user i and also sets Claims ← Claims||(i, M, σ).
-Q reveal : on input of a user index i, this oracle returns ⊥ if user i does not exist or if i ∈ U b . Otherwise, it returns the output of Reveal(i, transcripts) and adds i to Revs.
Misidentification Attacks. In a misidentification attack, the adversary is allowed to control a number of group members, which are introduced by invoking the Q a-join oracle. Through the Q p-join and Q sig oracles, he can observe operations while users are added and generate signatures. She is also given access to users' tracing information via the Q reveal oracle. Her goal is to produce a non-trivial valid signature that does not open to any of the users under his control or that cannot be traced back to one of them.
Definition 4.
A traceable signature is secure against misidentification attacks if, for any PPT adversary A, it holds that Adv
Framing Attacks. In a framing attack, the adversary can corrupt the group manager (via the Q S oracle) and observe the system while users are added and produce signatures. Two kinds of framing attacks are considered. First, the adversary is deemed successful if he manages to produce a signature that opens or traces to an innocent group member. Second, he also wins if he can either (1) forge an honest signer's claim w.r.t. that signer's long term public key; (2) successfully claim a signature produced (and possibly claimed) by another user as his own using her own long term public key. oracle) the threat of corrupted tracing agents. In the following, we will stick to that model. In applications where anonymity should be preserved when opening queries are allowed, it is not hard to modify our scheme (using the technique of [33] ) to obtain anonymity in the CCA2 sense.
Groth-Sahai Commitments
In the following, for equal-dimension vectors or matrices A and B containing group elements, A B stands for their component-wise product.
When based on the DLIN assumption, the Groth-Sahai proof systems [36] make use of a common reference string comprising vectors g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ∈ G 3 where, for some group elements g 1 , g 2 ∈ G, g 2 , g ). To commit to a group element X ∈ G, one picks r, s, t
When the proof system is chosen to provide perfectly sound proofs, g 3 is chosen as g 3 = g 1
, X · g r+s+t(ξ 1 +ξ 2 ) ) and decryption is possible using α 1 = log g (g 1 ), α 2 = log g (g 2 ). In the WI setting, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 are linearly independent and C is a perfectly hiding commitment. Under the DLIN assumption, the two reference strings are indistinguishable.
To commit to exponents x ∈ Z p , one uses vectors ϕ, g 1 , g 2 and computes C = ϕ x g 1 r g 2 s . In the soundness setting ϕ, g 1 , g 2 are linearly independent vectors whereas, in the WI setting, choosing
always gives a perfectly hiding commitment given that C is a BBS encryption of 1 G regardless of the value x.
To provide evidence that committed variables satisfy a set of relations, the proof systems of [36] start from the relations themselves and replace variables by commitments. The prover then generates a proof (consisting of a set of group elements) for each relation. The whole proof consists of one commitment per variable and one proof for each relation. Such efficient non-interactive proofs are available for pairing-product relations, which are of the type
for variables X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ G and constants t T ∈ G T , A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ G, a ij ∈ G, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Efficient proofs also exist for multi-exponentiation equations
Multi-exponentiation equations admit zero-knowledge proofs at no additional cost. On a simulated CRS (prepared for the WI setting), a trapdoor makes it is possible to simulate proofs without knowing witnesses and simulated proofs are perfectly indistinguishable from real proofs. As for pairing-product equations, zero-knowledge proofs are often possible but usually come at the expense of some overhead in comparison with NIWI proofs for the same equations: typically, the size of proofs may depend on the number of variables. In the paper, we only utilize NIZK proofs for multi-exponentiation equations.
In both cases, proofs for quadratic equations cost 9 group elements. Linear pairing-product equations (when a ij = 0 for all i, j) take 3 group elements each. Linear multi-exponentiation equations of the type
Construction
Intuition. The group manager has a public key comprising elements (Ω = g ω , h 0 , h 1 , h 2 ) and uses ω ∈ Z * p to generate membership certificates. These consist of 5 elements (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 , y) and are reminiscent of users' private keys in the Boyen-Waters group signature [20] . Namely, K 1 is derived as
, where s ID is chosen by GM and identifies the user U while x is only known to U as his membership secret. The last element y is chosen by GM as part the tracing trapdoor for U. The certificate also contains K 3 = g s ID and K 4 = u s ID 0 as in [20] . Security proofs also require to include K 2 = g 1/(ω+s ID ) (so that, as in [18] , ω and s ID simultaneously appear more than once as denominators in the exponent).
To enable traceability when the appropriate tracing trapdoor is revealed (which is sometimes called "implicit tracing", as opposed to the "explicit tracing" that appeals to the signature opening algorithm), each signature must contain certain "traceability values" that make it possible to link the signature to its issuer. One of the technical points to address is to get these traceability values to interact with Groth-Sahai proof systems in a simple way. Indeed, at some step of the proof of anonymity, knowledge of the underlying values will have to be simulated in a zero-knowledge manner (i.e., without knowing the actual witnesses). Previously used approaches to achieve implicit tracing using pairings (e.g., [23] ) would require the traceability components to satisfy some pairing-product equation [36] , for which zero-knowledge proofs usually come at some additional cost when they are at all possible. For this reason, as such traceability values, we rather let the signer include pieces of a linear tuple (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) = (g xδ 1 , g yδ 2 , g δ 1 +δ 2 ) -which is a set of multi-exponentiation equations in the Groth-Sahai terminology -in each signature in such a way that the tracing trapdoor (X = g x , y) allows testing whether a signature stems from user U by checking if e(T 1 , g) = e(X, T 3 /T 1/y 2 ). Thanks to the use of multi-exponentiation equations, knowledge of the underlying scalars δ 1 , δ 2 will be simulatable (in the WI setting) in a simple way in the proof of anonymity, which eventually relies on the sole DLIN assumption.
In traceability concerns, attention must be paid to the fact that users may be tempted to alter their membership certificate and modify the corresponding values x, y so as to defeat (implicit or explicit) tracing attempts. In the random oracle model, the problem is usually much easier in non-frameable pairing-based group signatures [43, 29, 26, 23] , where membership certificates also have one component of the form
. In those schemes, signatures prove knowledge of values (K 1 , x, y, s ID ) that satisfy the latter relation and, in the security proof, the forking lemma [44] allows extracting them in order to break some number theoretic assumption. In the present context, the problem is that committed exponents x, y, s ID ∈ Z p are not fully extractable from Groth-Sahai commitments (typically, only g x , g y , g s ID are extractable) and we must settle for extracting a non-trivial information on them when it comes to prove traceability. To this end, we require each signature to contain redundancies in the form of (commitments to) quantities h x 1 · h
and h x 3 ·h y 4 , for some group elements h 3 and h 4 , which render certificate randomizations infeasible (as established by the proof against Type III forgeries in the security analysis against misidentification attacks). We remark that, in [33] , Groth used a different method to build a non-frameable group signature using a certified signature scheme [12] . However, we cannot use the same technique since the underlying certified signature only allows signing single group elements whereas we need to bind both X ∈ G and y ∈ Z p to the membership certificate.
In [20] , group members sign messages m ∈ {0, 1} n by randomly choosing r $ ← Z p and computing pairs (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = (u [45] and a suitable number theoretic hash function G v : {0, 1} n → G (termed "programmable" by Hofheinz and Kiltz [37] ). In nonframeability concerns, we force signers to also use their membership secret x and generate pairs (θ 1 , θ 2 ) somewhat in the fashion of the Waters-based multi-signature of Lu et al. [41] . Instead of signing a message m as (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = (u
we need to generate such pairs as
for the proof of non-frameability to work. Of course, u 1 and the set of group elements that implement the number theoretic hash function G v (.) are assumed to come from a trusted key generation procedure. In particular, the discrete logarithm log g (u 1 ) must be held back from the group manager as, otherwise, a dishonest GM could frame honest users.
Signers are able to claim their signatures by proving knowledge of exponents x, y ∈ Z p such that
2 . These proofs are also non-interactive and make use of a second Waters-like number theoretic hash function G f : {0, 1} n → G, the parameters (f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f n ) ∈ R G n+1 of which must be generated by a trusted party (and not by the group manager as the latter could claim honest users' signatures if it were allowed to generate this reference string itself) when the scheme is set up. One difficulty is to prevent possibly dishonest group members from copying each other's claims. To this end, non-interactive claims are non-malleably bound to the long-term public key of the group member (as will be discussed hereafter, non-repudiation is enforced by having users register a public key upk in a PKI and use the private key usk to sign a piece of their membership certificate). In order to claim a signature containing traceability values (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) = (g xδ 1 , g yδ 2 , g δ 1 +δ 2 ) using their secret information x, y ∈ Z p , signers first compute a n-bit string m c = H(M ||T 1 ||T 2 ||T 3 ||upk) and generate two pairs (
) are in turn signed using the long-term private key usk associated with upk.
In order to ensure non-repudiation, users have to register a long term public key upk in some PKI. In non-repudiation concerns, the underlying private key usk is used to sign (using an ordinary signature scheme) parts (X, K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , y) of their membership certificate during the join protocol.
Description. In notations hereafter, it will be convenient to define the coordinate-wise pairing
T such that, for any element h ∈ G and any vector g = (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ), we have E h, g = e(h, g 1 ), e(h, g 2 ), e(h, g 3 ) . In addition, we also make use of a symmetric bilinear mapping
, where the non-commutative mappingF :
T sends ( X, Y ) onto the matrixF ( X, Y ) of entry-wise pairings (i.e., containing e(X i , Y j ) in its entry (i, j)).
Also, for any z ∈ G T , ι T (z) denotes the 3 × 3 matrix containing z in position (3, 3) and 1 G T everywhere else. For X ∈ G, the notation ι(X) will sometimes denote the vector (1, 1, X) ∈ G 3 .
Setup(λ, n): for security parameters λ and n ∈ poly(λ), choose bilinear groups (G,
The algorithm also specifies a hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n from a collision-resistant family. The group public key is defined to be
while the private key S := γ 1 , ω, α 1 , α 2 is given to the group manager.
Join (GM,U i ) : the prospective group member U i and the group manager GM run an interactive protocol whereby the user obtains a membership certificate cert i and a membership secret sec i . The protocol is the following:
1. User U i and the GM execute an interactive protocol (such as Groth's protocol [33, Section 4.1] recalled in appendix B) allowing them to jointly generate X = g x so that x ∈ Z p is randomly distributed and known only to the user while GM learns the corresponding public value X. 2. GM first computes h x 1 = X γ 1 and then uses it to compute
If so, he generates a signature sig i = Sign usk[i] X||K 1 ||K 2 ||K 3 ||g y and sends it back to GM.
0 to U i and stores the record
and his membership secret as sec i := x.
and sec i as x ∈ Z * p and conducts the following steps. 
3. Pick r s $ ← Z * p and compute
4. Commit to variables θ i , for i = 1, . . . , 9. That is, for i = 1, . . . , 9, randomly choose r i , 
, where ϕ = g 3 (1, 1, g). 5. Give proofs that committed variables θ 1 , . . . , θ 9 satisfy (1)- (5) and that σ 10 , σ 11 are commitment to values δ 1 , δ 2 satisfying
a. Relations (1)- (2) are quadratic pairing-product equations (in the Groth-Sahai terminology [36] ) over variables θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 6 . Each relation requires a proof consisting of 9 group elements. Let us call these proofs
). Relations (6) are multi-exponentiation equations. The first two ones are quadratic and the corresponding proofs π 6 = ( π 6,1 , π 6,2 , π 6,3 ) and π 7 = ( π 7,1 , π 7,2 , π 7,3 ) both consist of 3 vectors of G 3 . The third relation of (6) is a linear multi-exponentiation equation and the proof π 8 = (π 8,1 , π 8,2 ) is just 2 group elements. b. Relations (3)- (5) are linear pairing-product equations over variables θ 3 , . . . , θ 9 . Corresponding proofs cost 3 group elements each and π 3 , π 4 , π 5 are all vectors of G 3 .
For clarity, we abstract away the construction of these proofs from the present description and refer to appendix C for details on how proof elements are calculated.
The signature finally consists of σ = (
Verify(M, σ, Y): parse the signature σ as a tuple (
. Verifying π 1 , . . . , π 8 entails to check whether the following equations (some of which bear resemblance with relations (1)- (5)), where ϕ = g 3 (1, 1, g), are all satisfied. The verifier returns 1 if they are and 0 otherwise.
Open(σ, Y, S): parse the signature σ as (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , σ 1 , . . . , σ 11 , π 1 , . . . , π 8 ) and the private key S as
Check whether the database transcripts contains a record transcript i = (X, K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 , y, sig i ) such that θ 3 = K 3 , θ 8 = X and θ 9 = g y . If yes, return i as the signer's index. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Reveal(i, transcripts): to reveal the tracing trapdoor for user U i , scan the database transcripts to find transcript i = (X, K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 , y, sig i ) and output trace i := (X, y). 
Then, he picks r x , r y $ ← Z p and computes
The non-interactive claim consists of the tuple τ :
. . m c,n ∈ {0, 1} n , and return 1 iff
and Verify
Correctness of the Claiming Algorithm. We easily verify that honestly generated claims
are always accepted since they satisfy the relations
Including the signer's long-term public key upk[i] among the inputs of the hash function H in the computation of m c prevents other dishonest groups members from tampering with user i's claim τ = (D x,1 , D x,2 , D y,1 , D y,2 , csig i ) by replacing csig i with their own signature on the claiming information (D x,1 ||D x,2 ||D y,1 ||D y,2 ). As we shall see in the proof of security against framing attacks, dishonest group members will be unable to successfully claim an honest signer's signature as long as the Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
Discussion. The opening algorithm performs BBS decryptions on ciphertexts σ 3 , σ 8 and σ 9 . Theoretically, decrypting only σ 3 suffices (since s ID must be unique in the database transcripts). However, also decrypting σ 8 and σ 9 simplifies the proofs of security against misidentification attacks and framing attacks. In the former for instance, a failure of the implicit tracing mechanism implies a failure of the opening algorithm and reduces the number of cases to consider.
We note that the claiming algorithm does not make use of pairing-based non-interactive witness indistinguishable proofs. However, such techniques can be adapted to work in this context as well. Indeed, we can alternatively build on Groth's techniques for constructing simulation-sound NIZK proofs [32] [Section 6] and have the claimer generate a simulation-sound extractable (see [32] for definitions) proof that he knows x, y such that
and the private key associated with his long-term public key. Since simulation-sound extractable proofs are also non-malleable, the adversary cannot break the AND link between the two statements and re-use the proof of knowledge of x, y such that
In comparison with the latter technique, the advantage of our approach is to provide a better efficiency as claims only consist of four group elements and an ordinary signature. In addition, the signer's key pair (usk[i], upk[i]) can be a public key for any (not necessarily pairing-based) digital signature scheme.
Efficiency. From an efficiency standpoint, each signature consists of 83 group elements. Using a symmetric pairing configuration with 256-bit prime order groups, we obtain signatures of 2.593 kB.
Signing requires a few tens of exponentiations. While a number of pairing evaluations seem necessary to verify at first glance, probabilistic batch verification techniques (as exemplified in [11] ) allow for dramatic improvements (at the expense of a small probability of wrongly accepting an invalid signature) w.r.t. naive implementations where each pairing is calculated individually. When suitably processed altogether, verification equations 3-5 and 8 require to compute a product of no more than 9 pairings and a few multi-exponentiations. Verification equations 1-2 and 6-7 can be handled by first translating them into a randomized product of several bilinear maps of the type F (·, ·). The structure of matrices F (·, ·) then makes it possible the decrease the overall verification cost of conditions 1-2 and 6-7 to the equivalent of a product of 15 pairings and some multi-exponentiations.
Security
We establish the security of the scheme in the standard model under the assumptions of section 2.1 and the assumption that the digital signature scheme in use is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks (as defined in [31] and recalled in appendix A).
Security against Misidentification Attacks
Theorem 1 (Misidentification). The scheme is secure against misidentification attacks assuming that the -HSDH problem, where is the total number of Q a-join and Q p-join -queries, and the 1-mTDH problem are both hard in G.
Proof. To win the misidentification game, the adversary must output a non-trivial signature for which the opening algorithm or the implicit tracing algorithm fail to point to an adversariallycontrolled group member.
Let σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , σ 1 , . . . , σ 11 , π 1 , . . . , π 8 ) denote the adversary's forgery and let us first assume that Open(σ , Y, S) ∈ U a . We distinguish three cases:
-Type I forgeries are those for which the BBS decryption θ 3 = g s ID of σ 3 does not appear anywhere in transcripts. We distinguish Type I-A forgeries, where the underlying θ 3 = g s ID never appears at any time during the game, from Type I-B forgeries for which θ 3 does not correspond to any record of transcripts but did appear (implicitly, as part of K 3 ) in a join protocol (triggered by a Q a-join query) that aborted before reaching its last step.
-Type II forgeries are such that σ 3 decrypts to a value θ 3 = g s ID that was assigned to some honest user i ∈ U p (initialized via a Q p-join -query). Such forgeries thus include those for which the opening algorithm points to some user i ∈ U p who did not sign the corresponding message. -Type III forgeries open in such a way that σ 3 decrypts to the θ 3 -value of an adversariallycontrolled user in transcripts but ( σ 8 , σ 9 ) does not. These forgeries include those that would defeat the implicit tracing algorithm.
Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 show that, if the adversary could produce either of such forgeries, it would be possible to break the HSDH or the 1-mTDH assumption. Finally, one can readily check that an adversary cannot come up with a fake signature defeating the implicit tracing algorithm without being one of the above kinds of forgeries. Indeed,
Here, a failure of the implicit tracing necessarily means that A, acting as a cheating group member, was able to twist his membership certificate so as to keep the same s ID and alter the membership secret x or the "traceability component" y. We thus have a Type III forgery.
The security against Type I and Type II attacks can be established almost in the same way as traceability attacks are handled in the security proof of the Boyen-Waters group signature [20] and the proofs of lemmas 1 and 2 are available in appendix D.
Lemma 1. The advantage of any Type I forger A is bounded by
where a and p denote the number of Q a-join and Q p-join -queries respectively.
Proof. Given in appendix D.1.
Lemma 2. The scheme is secure against Type II forgeries under the HSDH assumption. The advantage of any Type II adversary A is at most
where a and s stand for the number of Q a-join and Q sig -queries.
Proof. Detailed in appendix D.2.
Type III forgeries are somewhat trickier to deal with. Indeed, the proof of lemma 3 is the most difficult part of the proof of security against misidentification attacks and it appeals to the non-standard 1-mTDH assumption. We leave it as an interesting problem to hedge against misidentification attacks using only the HSDH assumption.
Lemma 3. The advantage of any Type III adversary A is bounded by
where a is the number of Q a-join -queries.
Proof. In a successful Type III forgery σ , by assumption, the opening algorithm decrypts σ 3 to a value θ 3 = σ 3,3 · σ 3,1 −1/α 1 · σ 3,2 −1/α 2 that equals some K 3 appearing in the transcript of a user in U a whereas the BBS decryption of ( σ 8 , σ 9 ) does not match the values (X, y) that were assigned to that user.
The simulator B receives as input a modified 1-Triple Diffie-Hellman instance consisting of (g, A = g a , B = g b ) ∈ G 3 and a single pair (C = g 1/(a+c) , c) ∈ G × Z * p . To prepare the public key Y, it picks ω, ρ u,0 , ρ u,1 , β 0 , . . . , β n
At the outset of the simulation, B draws an index i $ ← {1, . . . , a } and initializes variables ctr a , ctr a , ctr p ← 0.
-Q a-join -queries: B increments ctr a and considers the following two cases.
-If ctr a = i , B acts as the group manager as specified by the protocol (recall that it knows ω and can always properly generate certificates). -If ctr a = i , B simulates A's view in the first step of the join protocol to force A's membership secret to be x (so that the public value is X = g x ). The simulation implicity defines
a+c − ω (and thus 1/(s ID i + ω) = a + c) by setting
In step 2, B first sends K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , y to A and aborts if he fails to send back a valid signature on X||K 1 ||K 2 ||K 3 ||g y . If A correctly answers, B hands him K 4 , increments ctr a and stores a record (N, transcripts N ), with N = ctr a + ctr p in transcripts. -Q p-join -queries and Q sig -queries: to answer Q p-join -queries, B follows the join protocol using the group secret key S := (γ 1 , ω, p) and increments ctr p . It can also perfectly answer signing queries on behalf of honest user since it knows their membership certificates and secrets. -Q Y and Q reveal (i)-queries: can be handled according to the specification of the scheme since B always knows the values requested by A. -Q sig -queries: always involve users in U p and B thus always knows private elements that it needs to answer the query.
Eventually, the adversary A comes up with a message M along with a valid traceable signature σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , σ 1 , . . . , σ 11 , π 1 , . . . , π 8 ) that must be a type III forgery. At this stage, B fails if the decryption of σ 3 differs from the element K 3 = C · g −ω that B calculated at the i th Q a-joinquery (as it guessed the wrong i ).
Otherwise, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 9}\{3}, it decrypts other σ i into θ i . as in the proofs of lemmas 1 and 2. Since the proof system is configured for the perfect soundness setting, it comes that
for some x , y ∈ Z * p that B does not know. However, if we set ∆x = x − x and ∆y = y − y , B can compute
which in turn reveal
, so that, if we implicitly define µ = γ 1 ∆x + γ 2 ∆y, B has eventually found a triple
Since γ 1 and γ 2 are both random and perfectly hidden from A's view, we have g µ = 1 G (and thus γ 1 ∆x + γ 2 ∆y = 0 mod p) with overwhelming probability (greater than 1 − 1/p) and the triple (g µ , g bµ , g abµ ) is non-trivial. We easily check that, if A is successful, so is B as long as it correctly guesses i ∈ {1, . . . , a }.
Security against Framing Attacks
Establishing the security of the scheme against framing attacks also entails to separately consider several kinds of forgeries.
Theorem 2 (Non-frameability). The scheme is secure against framing attacks assuming that: (i) the 1-mTDH assumption holds in G; (ii) the underlying digital signature is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks; (iii) H is a collision-resistant hash function.
Proof. As required by the model, we consider two kinds of frameability attacks.
-Type I attacks: the adversary outputs a pair (M , σ ) that opens or traces to signer i ∈ U b whereas i did not produce a pair (M, σ) such that (M, σ) ≡ s (M , σ ). We further distinguish Type I-A attacks, where no signer i ∈ U b produced (M, σ) with (M, σ) ≡ s (M , σ ), from Type I-B attacks, where at least one such pair was produced by another signer j = i.
-Type II attacks: the adversary breaks the security of the claiming procedure. In other words, he outputs a tuple (M , σ , τ , upk ) that causes the experiment of definition 5 to return 1 in either step 5 (i.e., the adversary forges an honest member's claim) or step 6 (i.e., an honest member's signature is claimed in the name of somebody else).
Lemmas 4 and 5 show that no PPT adversary can produce either kind of forgery as long as the 1-mTDH assumption holds.
The proof of lemma 4 is based on standard techniques (notably in the simulation of signing queries as in [14, 45] ) and separately considers two kinds of Type I attacks. An alternative proof allows considering a single kind of Type I attack. However, this alternative reduction is looser by another multiplicative factor of O( b ) (since it has to guess upfront which honest user will be framed) and eventually ends up with a degradation factor of O( s · b ). By separately analyzing Type I-A and Type I-B attacks as in lemma 4, the security bound only declines with max( s , b ).
Lemma 4. The scheme is secure against framing attacks of Type I if the 1-mTDH problem is hard and if H is a collision-resistant hash function. More precisely, the advantage of any adversary after s signing queries, b Q b-join -queries and c Q claim -queries is at most
where the first term accounts for the probability of finding collisions on H.
Proof. As discussed earlier, we distinguish two cases. The bound of the lemma's statement stems from the fact that B has to guess upfront, by flipping a fair binary coin independently of A's view, whether A will mount a Type I-A or Type I-B attack and set up the scheme accordingly. With probability 1/2, B guesses the correct type of attack and the result follows.
Type I-A attacks. We first assume that a Type I-A adversary A comes up with a forgery (M , σ ) that traces to some honest user i ∈ U b and that no message-signature pair (M, σ) such that (M, σ) ≡ s (M , σ ) was produced by any honest group member. We show that such an adversary allows solving a problem that is not easier than 1-mTDH since it consists in finding a triple (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) = (g µ , g bµ , g abµ ) given only (g, A = g a , B = g b ). We note that a triple (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) is an admissible solution if and only if it satisfies e(C 3 , g) = e(C 2 , A) and e(C 1 , B) = e(C 2 , g).
Given a problem instance (g, A = g a , B = g b ), the simulator B chooses the GM private key ω, α 1 , α 2 $ ← Z * p . It sets u 1 = A ∈ G and also picks k
. . , n as well as u 0 = g ρ u,0 and f = B ρ f . It also sets h i = g γ i ∈ G for i = 0, . . . , 4 with γ 0 , . . . , γ 4 $ ← Z * p and chooses g for the perfect soundness setting as specified by the setup algorithm, with
, for some random exponents
← G n+1 at random. Throughout the game, B interacts with A as follows.
-Q S -queries: if A decides to corrupt the group manager, B hands him the group manager's private key S = {γ 1 , ω, α 1 , α 2 }.
-Q b-join -queries: when A, acting as a corrupted group manager, wants to introduce a new honest user i in the group, B starts interacting with A in an execution of the join protocol and assumes the role of the new user. Namely, B chooses x i $ ← Z * p , sets X i = B x i ∈ G and simulates A's view in the first step to force user i's membership secret to implicitly become sec i = bx i (and the associated public value to be X i ). At step 2 of the join protocol, A outputs K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , y and B generates a signature on X i ||K 
Here, B aborts if J v (m) = 0. Otherwise, it picks r s $ ← Z * p and computes
which has the required distribution since, if we implicitly definer s = r s −(bx i δ 1 )/J v (m), it can be written (θ 4 = K 4 · u
Together with certificate components (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 ), the newly generated pair (θ 4 , θ 5 ) allows computing a traceable signature since elements (θ 6 , θ 7 ) can be obtained as (θ 6 , θ 7 ) = (X Finally, A outputs a traceable signature σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , σ 1 , . . . , σ 11 , π 1 , . . . , π 8 ), for some message M , that traces to some user i ∈ U b and for which no honest user produced a signature involving the same (M , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ). In the event that Sigs contains a tuple (M ,
, A was necessarily able to break the collision-resistance of H. Otherwise, B uses α 1 , α 2 to BBS-decrypt
The perfect soundness of the proof system ensures that
for some exponents s ID , r s , x , δ 1 ∈ Z * p , and where
Then, the simulator B halts and declares failure if J v (m ) = 0. Otherwise, B is able to compute Θ = u
, which must satisfy the equality e(Θ, g) = e(u 1 , T 1 ). Since σ traces to user i by assumption, we must have e(X i , T 3 /T 2 1/y ) = e(T 1 , g), where y is part of the tracing trapdoor that A assigned to i and X i = B x i for some x i which is known to B. Since u 1 = A, we find that the assignment
must satisfy relation (8) and thus solve the problem instance.
B's probability not to abort can be shown to be at least 1/(2n s ) as in the proof of lemma 2. The situation where σ accuses user i via the opening algorithm (instead of the implicit tracing) can be handled in the same way. Indeed, the perfect soundness of the proof system guarantees that, if a signature opens to user i , the tracing algorithm necessarily points to the same user.
Type I-B attacks. We still have to consider Type I-B forgeries σ that open or trace to some user i but involve a tuple (M , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) also appearing in a signature produced by j = i ∈ U b . We show that such forgeries imply an algorithm solving an equivalent formulation of the Diffie-Hellman problem (that is not easier than 1-mTDH) which is to compute g b/a given (A = g a , B = g b ). The simulator B performs the setup as in the expectation of a Type I-A attack but chooses u 1 ∈ G so as to know ρ u,1 = log g (u 1 ). Another difference is that, while f is still set as f = B ρ f , for some random ρ f
As in the case of Type I-A attacks, h 1 , h 3 ∈ G are chosen in such a way that B knows γ 1 = log g (h 1 ) and γ 3 = log g (h 3 ). Additionally, B chooses an index k $ ← {1, . . . , b } and interacts with the adversary A as follows.
-Q S and Q Y -queries: are handled as when dealing with Type I-A attacks.
-Q b-join -queries: when A decides to introduce a new user i, B's behavior depends on the index i ∈ {1, . . . , b } of the Q b-join -query.
-If i = k, B runs the join protocol on behalf of the prospective honest group member. It chooses x i $ ← Z * p , sets X i = A x i ∈ G and simulates A's view to end up with the public value X i (so that sec i = ax i is the implicitly defined membership secret). The next steps of the join protocol are executed as in the case of Type I-A forgeries.
-If i = k, B proceeds as in the first case but rather simulates A's view to force the public value X k to become B = g b (which implicitly sets sec k = b).
-Q sig -queries: since B knows ρ u,1 = log g (u 1 ), γ 1 = log g (h 1 ) and γ 3 = log g (h 3 ), it can perfectly simulate Q sig -queries by computing θ 4 using u
and (θ 6 , θ 7 ) as (X
). The simulator also retains the random values δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ Z p that are used to calculate T 1 , T 2 , T 3 at each query. -Q claim -queries: for each claiming query (i, M, σ), the simulator B first performs the same checks as in the case of Type I-A attacks. Then, B is able to generate claims on behalf of user k since X k = B and f 1/b = g ρ f is computable. For each user i ∈ U b such that i = k, B first computes the n-bit string m c = H(M ||T 1 ||T 2 ||T 3 ||upk) = m c,1 . . . m c,n ∈ {0, 1} n and evaluates
It aborts in the unlikely event that J = 0 (since the random values α f,0 , . . . , α f,n are completely independent of A's view, this occurs with negligible probability 1/p at each query). Otherwise, B recalls the value δ 1 such that T 1 = X
, which has the proper distribution since it can be expressed as (
After polynomially-many queries, A outputs a Type I-B forgery σ that opens or traces to some user i ∈ U b . By assumption, another user j ∈ U b must have issued a signature with the same (M , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) . At this stage, B fails if j is not the user that was introduced at the k th Q b-joinquery. With probability 1/ b however, B correctly guessed k. It also still knows the exponent δ 1 that was used by user j to calculate T 1 = X δ 1 k = B δ 1 . Moreover, since σ traces to user i , there must exist δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ Z p such that (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) = (A x i δ 1 , g y i δ 2 , g δ 1 +δ 2 ) and, given that B also knows the tracing trapdoor y i (that was supplied by A during the k th Q b-join -query), it can compute
The security against Type II attacks relies on the standard Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and the security of the ordinary signature scheme in the sense of [31] . It makes (now classical) use of the technique of [13, 45] and the "programmability" [37] of the number theoretic hash function G f : {0, 1} n → G. The proof is deferred to appendix E.
Lemma 5. The scheme is secure against Type II framing attacks if the Computational DiffieHellman problem is hard in G, if H is a collision-resistant hash function and if the ordinary digital signature is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks. More precisely, the advantage of any adversary after s signing queries, b Q b-join -queries and c claiming queries is at most
, where the first and second terms account for the probability of breaking the collision-resistance of H and the existential unforgeability of the signature, respectively.
Proof. Given in appendix E.
Anonymity
Since we introduced a claiming oracle in the modeling of anonymity, we are faced with the additional difficulty of simulating the Q claim oracle without always knowing the appropriate secret elements in the reduction. Fortunately, we can prove the result using only the DLIN assumption.
Theorem 3 (Anonymity). The scheme is anonymous assuming that the Decision Linear Problem is hard in G. More precisely, we have
where p and c denote the number of Q p-join -queries and the number of Q claim -queries, respectively.
Proof. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games organized in such a way that even a computationally unbounded adversary has no advantage in the final game while the first one is the real attack game. Throughout the sequence, we always call S i the event that the adversary wins and his advantage is measured by Adv i = |Pr[S i ] − 1/2|. Also, when we speak of user i, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p }, we mean the i th user that joins the group after a Q p-join query.
Game 1: operates as the real game does. The challenger B performs the setup according to the specification of the scheme. It chooses random exponents ω, γ 1 , . . . , γ 4 , ρ u,1 , ξ 1 , ξ 2 $ ← Z * p and sets g ω , h i = g γ i for i = 1, . . . , 4 and
. Using ω, γ 1 , it answers Q a-join and Q p-join -queries and updates transcripts each time. When the adversary A makes a Q reveal -query (resp. Q sig -query), B uses the database transcripts to return the queried tracing trapdoor (resp. recover the appropriate cert i and sec i and generate a signature on behalf of user i ∈ U p ). At the challenge phase, the adversary chooses two users i 0 , i 1 ∈ U p such that i 0 , i 1 ∈ revs and is returned a traceable signature σ on behalf of signer i d . Unlike what occurs in the real game, the challenger retains the values γ i = log g (h i ), for i = 1, . . . , 4, and ρ u,1 = log g (u 1 ) but this does not impact A's behavior. Eventually, he outputs a guess d ∈ {0, 1} and his advantage is
Game 2: we modify the simulation. At the beginning, B picks an index i $ ← {1, . . . , p }. In the challenge phase, B aborts if A's chosen pair (i 0 , i 1 ) does not contain i . It also fails if i is ever queried to Q reveal before the challenge step. Assuming that B is lucky when choosing i at the outset of the game (which is the case with probability 2/ p since i is independent of A's view), the introduced abortion rule does not apply. We can write Adv 2 = 2 · Adv 1 / p .
Game 3: we add yet another abortion rule. At the challenge step, we must have i ∈ {i 0 , i 1 } unless the abortion rule of Game 2 applies. The new rule is the following: when B flips its secret coin d $ ← {0, 1}, it aborts if i d = i . With probability 1/2, this new rule does not apply and we have
Game 4: we bring two modifications to the setup phase. Namely, B considers random group elements
1 . This change is purely conceptual since the distribution of f and (f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f n ) remains unchanged. We thus have Pr[S 4 ] = Pr[S 3 ] and Adv 4 = Adv 3 .
In the upcoming games, it will be convenient to define functions J, K : {0, 1} n → Z p that map n-bit strings m = m 1 . . . m n onto J(m) = α f,0 + n j= α f,j m j and K(m) = β f,0 + n j= β f,j m j . Game 5: we introduce a failure event F 5 . Namely, when the simulator B has to claim a previously generated signature σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , σ 1 , . . . , σ 11 , π 1 , . . . , π 8 ), it first computes the hash value
and aborts in the event 5 that J(m c ) = 0. Since the values {α f,i } n i=0 are completely random and independent of A's view, this can only happen by pure chance. At each query, the probability to have J(m c ) = 0 is thus at most 1/p. In addition, Game 5 and Game 4 proceed identically until event F 5 causes B to abort. It comes that |Pr[
Game 6: we modify the treatment of signing queries involving user i . Now, B re-uses the values z 1 = log g (Z 1 ) and z 2 = log g (Z 2 ) (introduced in Game 4) and implicitly defines user i 's membership secret to be sec i = z 1 while the value y of his membership certificate is z 2 . More precisely, its membership certificate is calculated as per
Unless the failure event of Game 2 occurs, no Q reveal query is made for i and B can answer signing queries without using z 1 , z 2 and knowing only Z 1 , Z 2 . Indeed, signing queries related to i can be answered by calculating θ 6 = Z
in the computation of θ 4 . The challenge signature, which B generates on behalf of i unless one of the previous failure events occurs, is produced in the same way. These changes do not affect A's view, so that Pr[S 6 ] = Pr[S 5 ] and Adv 6 = Adv 5 .
Game 7: we modify the treatment of Q claim -queries involving user i . Recall that, since Game 6, the simulator B answers Q sig -queries involving i by setting 
As for the second piece (
2 ) of the claim, B can generate it from f 1/z 2 = g ρ f , which is computable thanks to the way that f is chosen since Game 4. In Game 7, we note that B does not use the values z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z p at any time. Still, the introduced modifications are only conceptual and do not alter A's view. We can thus write Pr[S 7 ] = Pr[S 6 ] and Adv 7 = Adv 6 Game 8: we modify the setup phase and choose g 3 as g 3 = g 1
. We note that vectors g 1 , g 3 , g 3 are now linearly independent. Any noticeable change in the adversary's behavior is easily seen 6 to imply a statistical test for the Decision Linear problem so that we can write |Pr[
Game 9: in this game, we modify the generation of the challenge signature σ on behalf of i . The generation of σ 1 , . . . , σ 9 and π 1 , . . . , π 5 is still made using the actual witnesses sec i , cert i . In particular, B sets
g 2 s 9
g 3 t 9 as in Game 5. However, instead of generating σ 10 , σ 11 as well as π 6 , π 7 and π 8 using δ 1 , δ 2 such that T 1 = Z ι(g)
It can be checked that verification equations 6, 7 and 8 are still satisfied by the above assignment. To achieve perfect witness indistinguishability, π 6 and π 7 must be re-randomized (as explained in [36] ) to be uniform in the space of valid proofs for quadratic equations. On a simulated CRS ( g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ), simulated proofs are known to be perfectly indistinguishable from real proofs. Hence, this change is only conceptual and we have Pr[
Game 10: we bring a new change to the generation of the challenge σ . In Game 9, we had When A sees the challenge signature σ , however, T 1 , T 2 and T 3 reveal no information on d ∈ {0, 1}. Indeed, T 3 is completely random and T 1 , T 2 are compatible with either candidate i 0 , i 1 . Moreover, σ 1 , . . . , σ 9 are all perfectly hiding commitments and, in the WI setting, proofs π 1 , . . . , π 5 reveal no information on underlying witnesses sec i , cert i . Finally σ 10 , σ 11 are independent of d ∈ {0, 1} and so are simulated proofs π 6 , π 7 , π 8 .
Conclusion
This paper described the first efficient construction of traceable signature in the standard model. We additionally extended the original model in order to offer support for abuse-free non-interactive claiming mechanisms.
Securely implementing all the functionalities of the primitive without appealing to the random oracle idealization raised its deal of technical issues and we had to use several (non-standard) intractability assumptions to solve all problems encountered on the road. It would be interesting to see if TS systems can be even more efficiently obtained without sacrificing security guarantees in the standard model. Another open problem would be to extend the results of [10] and design multi-group extensions of traceable signatures outside the random oracle heuristic.
(ii) Sign is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes in a message M and the private key usk. It outputs a signature σ. (iii) Verify is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a message M , a public key upk and a signature σ. It outputs 1 or 0 depending on whether σ is deemed valid or not.
The standard notion of security for digital signatures is the one given by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [31] .
Definition 7 ([31]).
A digital signature Σ is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks if, for any PPT adversary A playing the game hereafter, it holds that Adv euf-sig (A) ∈ negl(λ).
1. The game begins with the challenger running (usk, upk) ← Keygen(λ) and giving upk to the adversary A. 2. A adaptively interacts with a signing oracle. Namely, at any time, A can ask for a signature on an arbitrary message M and the challenger responds by computing σ ← Sign usk (M ) and returning σ to A. 3. A outputs a message M and a signature σ . He wins if M was never queried for signature and Verify upk (M , σ ) = 1.
A's advantage Adv euf-sig (A) is simply his probability of victory, taken over all coin tosses.
B Groth's Key Generation Protocol
In [33] , Groth described the following 5-move protocol that allows a prospective group member U and a group manager GM to jointly generate X = g x ∈ G in such a way that only the user gets to know the membership secret sec i = x ∈ Z * p and the latter is further guaranteed to be uniformly distributed. The user U first generates g a . Both parties run a coin-flipping protocol to generate a random value b + c, that also serves as a challenge when U proves knowledge of a, and the common output finally consists of X = g a+b+c , whereas only U happens to know x = a + b + c.
4. GM opens the commitment B and sends the values b, s back to U. 5. U checks that B = g b · h s . If so, U sends z = (b + c)a + r mod p and η to GM and outputs
Under the discrete logarithm assumption in G, this protocol has black-box simulators that can emulate the view of a malicious user or a malicious group manager. In the former case, the simulator has rewind access to the malicious user and can force his private output to be a given value x ∈ Z p . In the latter case, the view of the malicious issuer can be simulated to get his output to be a given X ∈ G. Moreover, the simulator does not need to know x = log g (X).
= a + p , in G. Before preparing the simulation, B makes a guess d mode $ ← {0, 1} as to whether A will produce a Type I-A or Type I-B forgery.
Type I-A forgeries. In the expectation of a Type I-A forgery (d mode = 0), algorithm B picks ρ u,1 , ρ 0 , . . . , ρ n $ ← Z * p and sets v i = g ρ i , for i = 0, . . . , n, and u 1 = g ρ u,1 . It also defines u 0 = u ∈ G and h i = g γ i ∈ G for i = 0, . . . , 4 using randomly drawn γ 0 , . . . , γ 4 g α 2 , g ) and g 3 = g 1 ξ 1 · g 2 ξ 2 while f spans G 3 . It defines the group public key as
Then, B starts interacting with A and initializes ctr a , ctr a and ctr p to 0.
-Q a-join -queries: when A wants to introduce a malicious user in the group, he triggers an execution of the join protocol with B acting as the issuer. Then, B increments ctr a , chooses x, y $ ← Z * p and simulates A's view (using the black-box simulation technique of theorem 3 in [33] ) in step 1 of the protocol to make it end up with the public value X = g x (so that the new user's membership secret becomes x). Next, B uses (A ctr , B ctr , C ctr ), with ctr = ctr a + ctr p , and generates a certificate (
, A ctr , B ctr , C ctr ). Parts K 1 , K 2 , K 3 are sent to A along with y ∈ Z * p . When A responds with a signature on X||K 1 ||K 2 ||K 3 ||g y , B checks that the latter is valid. If so, B provides A with the final part K 4 of the membership certificate, increments ctr a , adds the current value of N = ctr a + ctr p in U a and stores (N, transcript N ) in transcripts.
-Q p-join -queries: when A asks B to introduce a new honest user, B increments ctr p and proceeds in the same way as with Q a-join -queries. The only difference is that it executes the join protocol in private and does not have the simulate the view of a malicious user in the first step. As previously, it uses the ctr th triple (A ctr , B ctr , C ctr ), with ctr = ctr a + ctr p , of the HSDH input to compute K 1 , . . . , K 4 . Also, B stores the index N = ctr a +ctr p of the new user in U p and the entry (N, transcript N ) in transcripts. The latter transcript is used to consistently answer subsequent signing queries that involve the new user. -Q Y -queries: upon A's request, B sends him the public key Y and the current number of users N = ctr a + ctr p in the group. -Q sig -queries: to answer signing queries involving honest group members (in U p ), B simply runs the signing algorithm according the its specification using the (known) membership certificate and the membership secret. -Q reveal (i)-queries: at any time, A may also ask for the tracing trapdoor of any user i ∈ U p (he already knows those of users in U a ). The simulator B can always answer such queries since it chose values (X = g x , y) itself when answering the matching Q p-join query.
When A outputs a Type I forgery σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , σ 1 , . . . , σ 11 , π 1 , . . . , π 8 ) for some message M ,
The perfect soundness of the proof system guarantees that
for some s ID ∈ Z * p (that differs from values s ID 1 , . . . , s ID with overwhelming probability 8 ) and r s , x, δ 1 ∈ Z * p . Then, B can extract a HSDH solution as
Type I-B forgeries. We now consider the case of a Type I-B forgery. When d mode = 1, B initially picks a random i $ ← {1, . . . , a }. The group public key Y is generated in the same way. The difference with the case d mode = 1 lies in the treatment of Q a-join queries: at the i th such query (when ctr a = i , B behaves as when d mode = 0), B conducts the first step as in the case d mode = 0 but the second step is run in a different way. It constructs (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 ) by picking t $ ← Z * p , and defining
This implicitly defines s ID ∈ Z * p to be t−ω. If A, acting as the malicious user, does not fail to respond as specified by the final step of the protocol, B aborts. Otherwise, the simulation continues. If A eventually outputs a forgery for which the BBS decryption of σ 3 is K 3 = g t ·Ω −1 (which occurs with probability 1/ a in a Type I-B forgery), the BBS decryption θ 4 of σ 4 must be u t−ω · u
Along with T 1 = g xδ 1 , ρ u,1 = log g (u 1 ) and the decryption g r of σ 5 , θ 4 must provide B with a new -HSDH triple (g 1/t , g t−ω , u t−ω ).
To conclude the proof, the actual kind of Type I forgery will match the value of d mode with probability 1/2 since d mode is independent of A's view.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is based on lemma A.2 in the security proof of the Boyen-Waters group signature [20] . As in the latter, the simulator B receives as input a a -HSDH instance comprising elements (g, Ω = g ω , u) ∈ G 3 as well as a set of triples
To prepare the public key Y, it picks a random index k
. . , n and u 1 = g ρ u,1 . It also defines u 0 = u ∈ G and h i = g γ i ∈ G for i = 0, . . . , 4 using random γ 0 , . . . , γ 4 $ ← Z * p and finally chooses vector sets g, f as specified by the setup algorithm. Before starting its interaction with the Type II forger A, B initializes counters ctr a , ctr a and ctr p to 0. These will account for the number of users in U a , the number of Q a-join -queries so far, and the number of users in U p , respectively.
-Q a-join -queries: adversarial-join queries are handled as in the proof of lemma 1. Namely, B increments ctr a , chooses random values x, y $ ← Z * p and simulates A's view in the first step of the protocol so as to force the new user's membership secret to become x. To generate A's membership certificate, B uses the next unused triple (A ctr a , B ctr a , C ctr a ) to produce K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 . If the join protocol successfully terminates, B increments ctr a , stores a record (N, transcript N ), with N = ctr a + ctr p , containing the interaction transcript in transcripts and adds index N in the set U a .
E Proof of Lemma 5
For convenience, we use the same variant of the CDH problem as in the treatment of framing attacks of Type I-B (in the proof of lemma 4). Namely, if the adversary is able to claim a signature of the same equivalence class as one created by an honest signer, we show how to compute g b/a given (A = g a , B = g b ).
We also consider two kinds of Type II attacks: Type II-A attacks are those for which step 6 is executed (which means that the condition of step 5 is not fulfilled) in the experiment of definition 5 whereas, in Type II-B attacks, the experiment returns 1 and halts at step 5.
As in the proof of lemma 4, the simulator has to guess whether A will be a Type II-A or a Type II-B attacker beforehand. To this end, he flips a fair binary coin at the very beginning of the game and prepares the public key accordingly.
Type II-A attacks. Let us first consider Type II-A attacks and assume an adversary A for which step 6 is reached in the non-frameability experiment (the case of the experiment returning 1 at step 5 will be easier to explain then). We outline a simulator B that uses A to solve a CDH instance (A = g a , B = g b ). Namely, B prepares Y as in the proof of security against Type I-B attacks. In particular, it knows discrete logarithms ω = log g (Ω), α 1 = log g (g 1 ), α 2 = log g (g 2 ), ρ u,1 = log g (u 1 ) and γ i = log g (h i ) for i = 0 to 4.
It also defines f = B and, as in previous lemmas, it randomly chooses a vector of group elements f = (f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f n ) ∈ G n using the technique of [45] in such a way that, for any m c ∈ {0, 1} n , it holds that G f (m c ) = f J(mc) · A K(mc) , for some integer-valued functions J(.), K(.) such that J(.) is small in absolute value and cancels with probability O(1/(n + 1) · c ). Throughout the game, B interacts with A as follows:
-Q S and Q Y -queries: are handled as when dealing with Type I forgeries.
-Q b-join -queries: at the i th such query, B runs the join protocol and plays the role of the prospective honest group member. It picks x i $ ← Z * p , sets X i = A x i ∈ G and simulates A's view in such a way that the public value becomes X i (and the underlying membership secret happens to be sec i = ax i ). Other steps of the join protocol are conducted as previously.
-Q sig -queries: at the j th Q sig -query involving user i ∈ U b , B retrieves the previously stored element X i = A x i and generates signature components (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) using the membership certificate (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 , y i ). It then chooses δ 1,ij , µ ij 
which implicitly definesδ 2,ij = aµ ij in such a way that T 2 = g y iδ2,ij and T 3 = g δ 1,ij +δ 2,ij . Signature components (θ 6 , θ 7 ) are computable as (X
2 ). Also, since B knows α 1 , α 2 , ξ 1 , ξ 2 such that ϕ = (g α 1 ξ 1 , g α 2 ξ 2 , g ξ 1 +ξ 2 +1 ), it is able to compute the commitment tõ δ 2,ij (i.e., σ 11 = ϕδ 2,ij g 1 r 11 g 2 s 11 , using random exponents r 11 , s 11 $ ← Z * p ) and the proof element π 7 (as described in appendix C).
-Q claim -queries: when user i ∈ U b is required to claim a message-signature pair (M, σ), where σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , σ 1 , . . . , σ 11 , π 1 , . . . , π 8 ), B returns ⊥ if i ∈ U b or if user i did not previously create a message-signature pair involving (M, T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ). Otherwise, B recalls the value x i , y i ∈ Z p such that X i = A x i and cert i = (K 1,i , K 2,i , K 3,i , K 4,i , y i ) as well as the scalars δ 1,ij , µ ij ∈ R Z p that were used to define T 1 = A x i δ 1,ij , T 2 = A y i µ ij and T 3 = g is computable by B. If the hash function H is collision-resistant, a sufficient condition for g b/a to be computable is to have J(m c ) = 0 in each Q claim -query and J(m c ) = 0 in the adversary's output (M , σ , τ ). As in previous lemmas, known results [37, 45] on "programmable" hash functions tell us that this condition is satisfied with probability O(1/4n c ).
Type II-B attacks. We are left with the case of Type II-B attacks where the experiment of definition 5 returns 1 at step 5 and does not reach step 6. In such a situation, the adversary breaks either the security (i.e., the existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack) of the ordinary signature scheme used by group members or the Diffie-Hellman assumption. Namely, when the adversary outputs (M , σ , τ ), where σ contains (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) and with τ = (D x,1 , D x,2 , D y,1 , D y,2 ), two situations can be distinguished.
